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Abstract 
Program managers and executives in the Department of Defense (DoD) have struggled for 
years to tailor the acquisition framework to promote delivery of information technology (IT) 
capabilities in small, frequent releases—the approach that characterizes Agile development. 
DoD acquisition professionals increasingly recognize the potential of Agile methods, but do 
not know how to apply Agile within the unique and complex defense acquisition environment. 
Several aspects of the defense acquisition process have proven especially challenging in the 
implementation of Agile practices. For example, the lack of knowledge about how to tailor the 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 process for an Agile development can deter a program from 
considering the use of Agile techniques in the first place. Many DoD IT acquisition programs 
are unfamiliar with the IT Box requirements concept, and thus cannot take advantage of its 
flexibilities to enable Agile development. In addition, long contracting timelines and the 
tendency to lock down Agile requirements in a contract have become barriers to 
implementing the speed and flexibility necessary for successful Agile adoption. This paper 
offers specific acquisition solutions and strategies to address these identified “high barriers” 
to Agile development in DoD. 
Introduction 
Agile software development practices integrate planning, design, development, and 
testing into an iterative lifecycle to deliver software at frequent intervals. Structuring 
programs and processes around small, frequent Agile releases enables responsiveness to 
changes in operations, technologies, and budgets. These frequent iterations effectively 
                                            
 
 
1 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Case Number 15-0905. The author’s affiliation 
with The MITRE Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to 
convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the positions, opinions or viewpoints 
expressed by the author. 
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measure progress, reduce technical and programmatic risk, and respond to feedback and 
changes more quickly than traditional waterfall methods (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). 
While the commercial sector has broadly adopted Agile development to rapidly and 
dynamically deliver software capability, Agile has just begun to take root in DoD acquisitions 
(Lapham et al., 2010; Northern et al., 2010). A dozen or more DoD IT acquisition programs 
have incorporated Agile concepts and practices. These early adopters, like any new 
venture, have experienced mixed results. Furthermore, despite the early adoption of Agile 
across several DoD IT acquisition programs, the DoD has issued no formal guidance and 
training on DoD Agile practices. Many acquisition professionals see the value and promise 
of Agile, yet struggle to incorporate it effectively in the Defense Acquisition Framework. 
Given that Agile in many ways differs so radically from the DoD’s traditional development 
practices, programs interested in using Agile encounter several challenges and barriers 
within the DoD acquisition system (Broadus, 2013).  
MITRE performed initial research to examine the leading Agile methodologies and 
commercial practices and explore how DoD acquisition structure and processes could be 
tailored to adopt Agile. The resulting Defense Agile Acquisition Guide2 provides acquisition 
professionals guidance and instruction for Agile adoption. Following the release of the guide 
in February 2014, MITRE conducted further research to capture best practices and lessons 
learned from early adopters across the DoD and other federal agencies. The research, 
based on years of experience and collaboration across Agile and IT acquisition 
communities, refined and extended strategies for tailoring each functional area of 
acquisition. This paper focuses specifically on three of the most difficult barriers to 
successful DoD Agile adoption: program structure, requirements, and contracting. The DoD 
can address these barriers by utilizing a proactively tailored Agile acquisition model, 
implementing an IT Box requirements process, and utilizing the flexible contracting 
approaches described in this paper. 
The first half of this paper provides an overview of the Agile development process 
and identifies some of the primary challenges in adapting commercial Agile practices for 
DoD implementations. Next, the paper examines prerequisites for effective adoption of Agile 
practices in the DoD. The remaining sections describe each of the three “high barrier” 
problem areas and offer specific recommendations that the DoD can use today to overcome 
these challenges.  
Background 
Agile Development Overview 
Agile software development emerged in 2001 after 17 industry leaders created the 
Agile Manifesto to design and share better ways to develop software (Agile Manifesto, n.d.). 
Agile prioritizes early and continuous deliveries of working software; adapts easily to 
changing requirements; depends on small, empowered teams; and promotes active user 
involvement during development.  
Agile development can be distilled into four core elements: 
                                            
 
 
2 A copy of the guidebook can be obtained at http://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-
papers/defense-agile-acquisition-guide-tailoring-dod-it-acquisition-program  
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 Focusing on small, frequent capability releases  
 Valuing working software over comprehensive documentation  
 Responding rapidly to changes in operations, technology, and budgets 
 Actively involving users throughout the development process to ensure high 
operational value 
The foundation of Agile is a culture of small, dynamic, empowered teams actively 
collaborating with stakeholders throughout product development. Agile development 
requires team members to follow disciplined processes that require training, guidance, and 
openness to change (GAO, 2012). While Agile does impose some rigor, the method does 
not consist of simply following a set of prescribed processes, but instead allows dynamic, 
tailored, and rapidly evolving approaches that suit each organization’s IT environment.  
Various Agile methods (e.g., Scrum, Extreme Programming (XP), Kanban, Test 
Driven Development) have emerged, each with unique processes, terms, and techniques 
(Modigliani & Chang, 2014). These methods focus on the development team and associated 
stakeholders. Agile Acquisition extends Agile development practices beyond the contractor 
development team to the government acquirer, users, and other stakeholders. It requires 
that both agencies and contractors change many acquisition roles, processes, and culture, 
thereby fostering a close government–industry partnership (Balter, 2011; Lapham et al., 
2010). This, in turn, demands investments in time, training, and continuous improvement to 
pay long-term dividends. While both practical experience and research findings strongly 
indicate the value of Agile acquisition for many IT development programs, this approach 
may not be appropriate in all cases (Lapham et al., 2010). Programs should consider Agile 
Acquisition when 
 Users can decompose requirements into small tasks for iterative 
development. 
 The operational environment can support small, frequent capability deliveries. 
 Users can engage throughout development to capture concepts of operations 
(CONOPS) and provide feedback on demonstrated capabilities. 
 Program can use existing infrastructure and focus development on the 
application layer. 
 Industry partners are available with relevant domain expertise in Agile 
practices. 
 Milestone Decision Authority supports Agile development practices and 
tailored processes. 
Agile and the DoD Acquisition Environment 
Despite the success that Agile development has achieved in the private sector, 
commercial implementation of Agile does not directly translate to Agile adoption in the 
federal sector. The barriers to program structure, requirements, and contracting often stem 
from these key differences. First, the government must adhere to a set of rigorous policies, 
statutes, and regulations that do not apply to the same degree to the commercial sector 
(Lapham et al., 2011). Following the rules that govern federal acquisition often involves a 
bureaucratic, laborious, and slow process that greatly influences how effectively the DoD 
can implement Agile. Second, the commercial sector has a different stakeholder 
management process than the government. Private firms are accountable to an internal and 
layered management structure that usually goes no higher than a corporate board of 
directors; the few possible external stakeholders (e.g., labor unions) rarely cause frequent 
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and major disruptions. The government bureaucracy has layers upon layers of stakeholders 
with a high degree of influence that can create frequent and significant disruptions. 
Everything from a change in the political administration to budget sequestration can exert 
significant external influence on a DoD program. Lastly, the bureaucratic layers of 
government make it difficult to empower Agile teams to the same extent as in the private 
sector. The commercial sector has considerable latitude to make adjustments throughout 
the course of the development because companies closely link accountability, authority, and 
responsibilities to push decision-making to the lowest levels. The government’s tiered 
management chain of command makes it difficult for the Agile team to make decisions 
quickly and unilaterally.  
The above comparisons demonstrate the need for the DoD to tailor Agile processes 
to its unique set of policies and laws. Herein lies the fundamental issue with Agile adoption 
in the DoD. The practices, processes, and culture that have made Agile development 
successful in the commercial sector often run counter to the current practices, processes, 
and culture in the long-established defense acquisition enterprise (Broadus, 2013). In many 
ways, the acquisition environment needed to execute Agile development is the opposite of 
the acquisition environment in place today.  
 The small, frequent capability releases that characterize the Agile 
development approach directly contrast with the traditional DoD acquisition 
model designed for a single big-bang waterfall approach (Broadus, 2013). 
Currently, every step in the acquisition system must be extensively 
documented and approved prior to execution. For example, according to 
DoDI 5000.02, a DoD IT acquisition program must meet 34 statutory and 
regulatory documentation requirements prior to entering Milestone A 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2015), whereas Agile emphasizes working 
software over comprehensive documentation (Lapham, 2012).  
 Agile also enables rapid response to changes in operations, technology, and 
budgets. By contrast, the DoD requires budgets, requirements, and 
acquisitions to be planned up front, sometimes several years in advance of 
execution, and changing requirements, budgets, and strategies during the 
execution process is disruptive, time-consuming, and costly (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014).  
 Lastly, Agile values active involvement of users throughout the development 
process to ensure high operational value, and continuously re-prioritizes the 
ongoing requirements process on the basis of feedback from the user 
community on deployed capabilities. Today’s DoD requirements process is 
static, rigid, and limits active user involvement and feedback during the 
development process (Lapham et al., 2010).  
Given these key differences, the DoD has been ill prepared to adopt Agile 
development practices and in fact Agile implementations so far have not always succeeded. 
Some early DoD adopters attempted what they thought or promoted as “Agile,” yet they did 
not incorporate some of the foundational Agile elements into their structures or strategies. 
This resulted partly from the lack of definition and standardized processes for Agile in the 
federal sector. In some cases, programs implemented a few Agile principles, such as 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 114 - 
breaking large requirements into smaller increments, but did not integrate users during the 
development process to provide insight or feedback. Other programs structured capability 
releases in a time-boxed manner,3 yet did not understand what to do when releases could 
not be completed in time.  
Adopting only a handful of Agile practices without a broader Agile strategy often fails 
to achieve desired results (GAO, 2012). For example, one DoD early adopter initially 
attempted to implement Agile practices by breaking large requirements into several four-
week sprint cycles. However, the program lacked high-level agreement on what to develop 
in each cycle, and did not have a robust requirements identification and planning process in 
place. Furthermore, the program lacked an organized user community and active user-
participation throughout the development process—a fundamental Agile tenet. As a result, 
the Agile processes quickly degenerated and the program only delivered 10% of its 
objective capability after two years of failed Agile development attempts. The program finally 
retreated to a waterfall-based process. It simply could not execute the Agile strategy without 
the proper environment, foundation, and processes in place. On the other hand, the DoD 
has recorded some significant successes with Agile, such as the Global Combat Support 
System–Joint (GCSS-J) program, which has routinely developed, tested, and fielded new 
functionality and enhanced capabilities in six-month deployments (Defense Information 
Systems Agency, 2015).  
Prerequisites for Agile Adoption  
The Agile model represents such a radical change in the way the DoD conducts 
business that the DoD must actively rethink how programs are managed and structured to 
support Agile (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). This requires restructuring the current acquisition 
environment (i.e., policies, processes, and culture) to enable success.  
As a starting point, the DoD should adopt a common understanding of Agile and 
identify the underlying set of values that describe the purpose and meaning of DoD Agile 
practices. The authors propose the following guiding principles for DoD Agile adoption:  
1. Focus on small, frequent capability releases to users—Smaller releases 
are easier to plan, present lower risks, and are more responsive to changes. 
Projects should focus on delivering working software as the primary objective.  
2. Embrace change—Projects must allow for changes to scope and 
requirements based on operational priorities, user feedback, early 
developments, budgets, technologies, etc. This requires flexible contracts, 
strong collaboration, and rigorous processes. Projects should plan early and 
then adapt based on current conditions.  
3. Establish a partnership between the requirements, acquisition, and 
contractor communities—Projects should foster active collaboration on 
operations, technologies, costs, designs, and solutions. This requires 
committed users who contribute to development, tradeoff discussions, and 
regular demonstrations of capabilities. 
                                            
 
 
3 A time-box is a fixed time period allocated to each planned activity. For example, within Agile, a 
sprint is often time-boxed to a 4–6 week time period or a release is time-boxed for a 4–6 month time 
frame. 
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4. Rely on small, empowered, high-performing teams to achieve great 
results—Organizing around each release with streamlined processes and 
decisions enables faster deliveries that are more successful.  
5. Leverage a portfolio structure—Individual programs and releases can 
deliver capabilities faster by using portfolio or enterprise strategies, 
processes, architectures, resources, and contracts. 
These tenets align with the recommended set of principles in the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report on Effective Practices and Federal Challenges in 
Applying Agile Methods. They center on the Agile Manifesto themes of small, frequent 
capability releases, a dynamic requirements process that allows for the continuous 
prioritization of requirements, active involvement from the user community throughout the 
development process, and commitment to delivering working software based on a time-
boxed schedule. Some efforts may succeed in implementing only a subset of these themes 
and delivering effective software solutions; however, one could argue that this would not 
constitute a pure Agile development.  
The DoD would benefit from defining and standardizing Agile-based practices to 
ensure a Department-wide consistent and common understanding of what constitutes an 
Agile-based DoD program or project (Lapham et al., 2010). Today, many efforts are 
inaccurately labeled as Agile, leading to misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Agile 
principles. After defining the principles, the DoD needs to provide detailed guidance to the 
acquisition community that describes how to execute the Agile acquisition processes within 
DoD acquisition regulations and laws (Broadus, 2013). This level of detailed process-level 
guidance falls outside the scope of this paper, but the Defense Agile Acquisition Guide 
offers further details on the guidance needed for the DoD to make Agile adoption effective 
and widespread. This paper centers on the aspects of the DoD acquisition process that 
have proven most problematic when implementing Agile development concepts. The 
following sections focus on three of the most difficult barriers for DoD Agile adoptions: 
program structures, requirements, and contracting. 
Structuring an Agile Program 
Structuring a program for Agile development differs significantly from structuring an 
IT program around a traditional development methodology. Traditional waterfall programs 
usually have discrete acquisition phases driven by milestone events to deliver a large 
capability. Agile is more dynamic and requires the program to be structured to support 
multiple, small capability releases (Lapham, 2012).  
Structuring an Agile program in this way represents a fundamental first step in 
developing a strategy for program-level Agile adoption. This activity requires the program to 
make significant adaptations to the traditional DoDI 5000.02 program structures and 
acquisition processes to support Agile development timelines and objectives (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014). Although the DoDI 5000.02 acquisition policy places heavy emphasis on 
tailoring acquisition models to meet program needs, programs often do not know how to do 
so effectively and receive approval from process owners (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). It 
takes years of experience to truly understand the nuances involved in tailoring an acquisition 
program. Given the radical differences between Agile and a traditional development model, 
programs often view this activity as too complicated and therefore fail even to consider the 
Agile development process for a program. Programs must be designed in such a way that 
they not only meet all the DoDI 5000.02 statutory and regulatory requirements, but are also 
executable and marketable to senior acquisition executives who may be unfamiliar with the 
details of the Agile process. The following sections describe a recommended approach to 
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structuring an Agile DoD program, starting with the process to structure an Agile release and 
building on this concept to develop a fully tailored DoD Agile acquisition program.  
Agile Releases and Potential Program Structures 
When developing an Agile program structure, a program should first decide how to 
structure its releases. The release represents the core element of the program structure, 
guiding how frequently the program delivers capabilities to the warfighters. The length of 
each release depends upon operational, acquisition, and technical factors. As a general 
guideline, most releases should take less than 18 months, with a goal of 6–12 month 
timelines. Program offices should tailor acquisition processes to support these release 
timelines. In some cases, this requires redesigning key acquisition processes around a 6–12 
month release rather than a 5–10 year increment.  
Each release comprises multiple sprints and a final segment for release testing and 
certification. Each sprint, in turn, includes design, development, integration, and test, and 
culminates in demonstration of capabilities to users and other stakeholders. Developers may 
be required to deliver interim code to the government at the end of each sprint or multiple 
sprints. The government can integrate the interim code into its software environment for 
testing and operational assessments. Figure 1 shows a potential 6-month release structure 
with five monthly sprints. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a potential 12-month release structure with seven 6-week sprints. 
Programs must adjust the length of the sprints and releases as conditions warrant. The key 
is to establish consistent, time-boxed releases, ideally small and frequent to allow for 
iterative development that responds easily to changes. 
 
 
After determining a release strategy, each effort should tailor its programmatic and 
acquisition processes to effectively enable Agile development practices. Figure 3 illustrates 
one potential structure at a top level. In this approach, requirements, technology, and 
architecture development are continual processes rather than sequential steps in early 
acquisition phases. Each release involves a series of sprints to iteratively develop and test a 
capability, ultimately leading to capability deliveries to the warfighter every six months upon 
approval. Instead of bounding development via a series of increments with Milestones B and 
C at each end, development thus becomes a continual process. Semi-annual reviews with 
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senior leadership and other key stakeholders ensure transparency into the program’s 
progress, plans, and issues. Programs provide additional insight to executives via monthly 
or quarterly reports and other status meetings. 
 
 
A core theme throughout DoDI 5000.02 is the tailoring of program structures and 
acquisition processes to meet the needs of the individual program. The policy includes 
several acquisition models to consider, such as Model 2 for defense-unique software, Model 
3 for incrementally fielded software, and hybrid Model B for software dominant programs. 
Figure 4 shows a proactively tailored acquisition model based on the three software models 
in DoDI 5000.02. The Defense Agile Acquisition Guide contains more detail about the 
structure and accompanying acquisition processes for DoD Agile adoption. 
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Agile Requirements Process 
The Agile requirements process values flexibility and the ability to reprioritize 
requirements as a continuous activity based on user inputs and lessons learned during the 
development process. In contrast to current acquisition practices, the Agile methodology 
does not force programs to establish their full scope, requirements, and design at the start, 
but assumes that these will change over time.  
At present, the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process 
guides the DoD requirements process. The traditional JCIDS process, based on lengthy and 
labor-intensive efforts to capture and define requirements, prevents agility (Lapham et al., 
2011). The DoD has recognized that this process was particularly inappropriate to IT 
development because of the rapid pace of change in IT compared with the JCIDS 
requirements definition timeline. As a result, the DoD updated the JCIDS by approving an 
“IT Box” to better accommodate the dynamic nature of IT and the shortened timelines 
required to rapidly field IT-enabled operational capabilities (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2010). The IT Box describes the operational performance and life-cycle 
affordability bounds of the program. The boundaries imposed by the “Box” expedite program 
initiation and streamline oversight by reducing return trips to the JROC for change approval.  
However, even with the introduction of the IT Box model to provide more flexibility in 
the requirements process, many programs still struggle with how to apply this model to their 
IT development programs. As programs strive to structure their programs around Agile-
based concepts as described in the previous section, they find it further confounding to 
figure out how to apply the IT Box model to satisfy the JCIDS requirements process. The 
following section contains specific recommendations on how to apply the IT Box concept to 
a DoD Agile development program. 
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Applying the IT Box Model for Agile Development 
In the JCIDS IT Box model, an acquisition program develops an “IS-Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD)” for JROC approval, while the traditional Capability 
Development Documents (CDDs) and Capability Production Documents (CPDs)4 are no 
longer required. Figure 5 illustrates the four sides of the IT Box identified in the IS-ICD.  
 
 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2012) 
As long as programs operate within these four sides of the IT Box, they need not 
return to the JROC for approval or oversight. In lieu of CDDs and CPDs, programs can 
develop Requirements Definition Packages (RDPs) to capture a subset of the IS ICD scope 
and/or Capability Drop (CD) documents for smaller items such as applications (see Figure 
6).5 Most important, the requirements documents are designed for a smaller scope of work 
and approval at a lower level. This flexibility and streamlining of IT requirements enables 
Agile development within a DoD program. Programs should take advantage of this and 
avoid developing a CDD or CPD. Managers can formulate the requirements process for the 
overarching acquisition using the JCIDS IT Box process to build in flexibility from a high-
level operational standpoint. Once an Agile approach has been designed into the program, 
programs must ensure they establish a flexible process for managing requirements from a 
functional capability standpoint (Modigliani & Chang, 2014). 
                                            
 
 
4 CDDs and CPDs are traditional JCIDS requirements documents that describe the program and 
program increment requirements. 
5 Services and requirements oversight organizations have the flexibility to identify alternative names 
for these documents, along with their scope, content, and approval processes. 
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With the IT Box construct in place and the appropriate documentation requirements 
fulfilled, programs can manage the technical requirements in an Agile environment via 
program, release, and sprint backlogs.6 Backlogs could take the form of databases, Excel 
spreadsheets, or Agile development software tools. The product owner, the person 
responsible for requirements, actively manages (grooms) program and release backlogs, 
working with the user community and other stakeholders to identify the greatest level of 
detail for the highest priority requirements. 
Figure 7 shows the relationships among the program, release, and sprint backlogs. 
The program backlog contains all desired functionality and requirements. A release backlog 
typically comprises the highest priority requirements from a program backlog that a team 
can complete within the established timeframe. A sprint then addresses the highest priority 
requirements from the release backlog. Once the development team commits to the scope 
of work for a sprint, that scope is locked. Sprint demonstrations conducted by the contractor 
at the end of a sprint may identify new features or defects that the team would add to the 
release or program backlogs.  
                                            
 
 
6 A program backlog is the primary source of all requirements/desired functionality for the program. A 
release backlog is a subset of the program backlog listing features intended for the release. A sprint 
backlog is a subset of the release backlog listing the user stories to implement in the sprint. 
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The product owner, actively collaborating with users and stakeholders, is responsible 
for grooming the backlog to ensure the content and priorities remain current as teams 
receive feedback and learn more from developments and external factors. Users and 
development teams may add requirements to the program or release backlog or shift 
requirements between them. The release and development teams advise the product owner 
on the development impacts of these decisions, while users advise the release team about 
the operational priorities and impacts. To address a specific user story, the program must 
understand dependencies on existing or planned capabilities. Some programs may turn to a 
Change Control Board to make some of the larger backlog grooming decisions. The use of 
this model, combined with the IT Box structure, can help set a DoD Agile acquisition 
program on the right path for implementation (Modigliani & Chang, 2014).  
Contracting for Agile Development 
This section summarizes the difficulties of executing Agile development in the current 
government contracting environment and suggests available options.  
Challenges 
Contracting for Agile development has proven tremendously difficult not only for the 
DoD but also for many other federal agencies. The July 2012 GAO Report on Effective 
Practices and Federal Challenges in Applying Agile Methods cites “Procurement practices 
may not support Agile Projects” as a key challenge area. Contracting for Agile development 
presents a unique challenge to the government not often encountered in the private sector 
because commercial firms often rely on in-house staff to execute the Agile practices, 
whereas the government must obtain Agile development support through a contract 
arrangement.  
This poses several challenges for the government. First, the government contracting 
process emphasizes competition and is guided by a set of policies and laws articulated in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Government programs cannot simply choose any 
Agile development contractor they like, but must follow a specific set of contracting 
processes and protocols to obtain contracted support in a fair and transparent manner. 
These government contracting laws and regulations have resulted in long contracting 
timelines that in themselves pose significant difficulty for government implementation of 
Agile. A competitive IT contract can take over a year to award. This prevents execution of 
the Agile development process, which relies on short delivery cycles and time-boxed 
schedules (Lapham et al., 2011).  
Next, the government contracting process requires programs to define the contract 
requirements upfront in a Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
so that a contractor can prepare a technical and cost proposal against the SOW/PWS 
requirements. The government uses the contractor’s proposal to determine the contract 
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scope, schedule, and cost. Herein lies one of the biggest obstacles to Agile implementation. 
One of the key tenets of Agile development is a dynamic requirements process that does 
not lock down requirements. The government therefore confronts the very difficult challenge 
of figuring out how to define requirements in a SOW/PWS to award the development 
contract, without locking down the technical requirements to a point where the contractor 
has no flexibility during the execution of the Agile development process (Balter, 2011).  
Following contract award, successful Agile development depends on the ability to 
reprioritize requirements as program staff “learn” throughout the development process and 
re-scope the effort as needed. Today, however, post-award management of the contract is 
often inconsistent. In some cases, the contractor has minimal oversight and management 
and government–contractor interaction occurs only during infrequent reviews. By contrast, 
Agile requires very close management of the government–contractor relationship, with 
frequent, often daily, interaction between them.  
Lastly, the award of a government contract today often relies on the strength of the 
proposed technical solution. Under Agile, the government and contractor together determine 
the technical solution in the course of executing the Agile development process. Thus, 
contract award should be based on the strength of the development team and the team’s 
experience using Agile practices.  
Solutions 
Given the disparity between traditional contracting practices and the needs of Agile, 
the government has encountered difficulties in contracting for Agile development. However, 
programs should consider the following solutions.  
First, programs must plan contracts well in advance of the proposed Agile 
development. In many cases today, contracting can become the long-lead item in the 
development process if it is not properly considered in the upfront planning process.  
Second, the program must determine if it will use a service or a product contract. A 
service contract is highly recommended because this vehicle would provide the program 
with greater flexibility to modify requirements along the development process (Modigliani & 
Chang, 2014). A service contract is more flexible for Agile efforts than a product contract 
because it describes requirements in terms of the people and time required to execute the 
development process rather than locking down the technical details of the end-product 
deliverable. However, this strategy assumes the program is the lead systems integrator and 
is responsible for overall product rollout and delivery. If the government expects the 
contractor to act as the systems integrator, determine the release schedule, and be 
accountable for overall product delivery, then a product-based contract in which the 
government describes overall delivery outcomes and objectives is more practical. However, 
this scenario would make it difficult for the government to execute a true Agile process, 
because changes to requirements in the course of development, or a change to the delivery 
schedule, will require a contract negotiation that could affect the Agile process. If the 
government does execute a product-based contract, it should pursue an indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle and define product-based task orders based on 
either the release or the sprint level, depending on which level has the best-defined 
technical requirements (e.g., user stories). The program must carefully balance the 
advantages of a service versus a product contract based on a determination of government 
versus contractor responsibilities for the Agile processes.  
Next, the program must determine the type of contract vehicle and strategy. Some 
cases require a separate stand-alone contract; in others, the government could leverage an 
existing contract vehicle. Programs must conduct thorough market research to determine if 
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an existing contract vehicle could meet their needs. When analyzing existing contract 
vehicles, a program must review the contract scope to ensure it can support Agile processes 
and evaluate the capabilities of the contract awardees to determine if they have Agile 
expertise and experience and if the labor categories and rates are compatible with the 
program’s level of complexity (Lapham et al., 2011).  
Lastly, the program should focus on the competition strategy to be used for the initial 
award as well as for follow-on task orders and awards. This will help determine how to 
scope the contract or task order for each contract action. In some cases, the program would 
benefit from bundling a set of releases into a single contract action to minimize the number 
of contract activities during the development process. However, the program should balance 
this against the need to maintain continuous competition throughout the program lifecycle to 
keep rates low and receive the best value for products and services.  
Using a Contract Vehicle to Support Agile Program Structure 
As stated above, a services contract may represent a good strategy for a program 
seeking to acquire the skills and expertise of a developer to participate in a government-led 
Agile team. The program can pursue a separate stand-alone contract for Agile support 
services, or can consider leveraging an existing contract vehicle such as a GSA Schedule to 
acquire Agile support services on a task order basis. This strategy works well for a program 
that will need consistent Agile support to develop a single product, but is not recommended 
when pursuing a product-based contract, because the program would have to define 
requirements too far in the development process to gain the benefits of an Agile process 
(Modigliani & Chang, 2014). As illustrated in Figure 8, such a program would require 
consistent support throughout the development of several release cycles. 
 
 
A multiple-award IDIQ contract can allow a program to use several development 
contractors. This strategy would enable the program to maintain continuous competition for 
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future task orders and/or execute parallel development. Under this strategy, the program 
would award IDIQ contracts to two or more qualified vendors to compete on individual task 
orders, as illustrated in Figure 9. The program office would have to work closely with the 
contracting office to streamline contract timelines to enable rapid execution of task orders. 
This could be achieved by using standardized business practices, templates, and 
streamlined selection criteria. Past performance on task orders would become a weighted 
selection criterion for future work, further motivating contractor performance.  
 
 
However, this strategy can also complicate integration and require increased 
resources to award and manage multiple contracts and developments (Lapham et al., 
2011). To mitigate the integration risks of using two or more vendors, the government must 
dedicate time and effort to developing a rigorous architecture, interfaces, standards, and 
systems engineering processes. Each vendor should have active representation on the 
systems engineering Integrated Product Team to ensure a common understanding and 
maturation of these systems engineering elements throughout development. To foster 
coordination across vendors, the program should require the use of a common tool suite in 
the Request for Proposals process, and should also identify an initial set of required metrics 
each vendor must collect and report. In accordance with the contract, within the first 90 days 
of contract award, the vendors must submit to the program office an agreed-upon updated 
set of metrics proposed for review and approval.  
If the program has reached a more mature stage of development with clearly defined 
releases, it may be feasible to execute product-based task orders. If requirements are 
dynamic and the program is in the initial stages of executing Agile, it would make more 
sense to use a service task order and compete the task orders for a set of releases.  
Summary 
The focus on iterative development and frequent capability deployments makes Agile 
an attractive option for many DoD IT acquisition programs, especially time-sensitive and 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 125 - 
mission-critical systems. However, Agile differs so profoundly from traditional development 
practices that the DoD must overcome significant challenges to foster greater Agile 
adoption. The DoD cannot expect individual programs to tailor current acquisition processes 
on their own, because the complexities of the DoDI 5000.02 processes do not lend 
themselves to obvious solutions, let alone solutions that accommodate processes so 
fundamentally different from current DoD practices. Following the guidance offered in this 
paper would better equip programs to tailor the DoDI 5000.02 for Agile execution. As they 
face the next challenge of defining requirements in a way that meets rigorous JCIDS 
standards, programs can use the IT Box model outlined in this paper to enable the speed 
and flexibility required for Agile requirements. Lastly, programs can utilize the contracting 
strategies presented in this paper to acquire development support and utilize flexible 
contract vehicles that support Agile practices.  
This paper has offered potential solutions to these key challenges in order to aid 
programs in laying a foundation for successful Agile implementation. As Agile adoption 
continues to take root and expand across programs, the DoD would benefit from additional 
guidance and training to ensure consistent and pervasive success in Agile IT acquisition. 
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